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PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED STATES 






This MBA professional report explores the historical performance of the United 
States Marine Corps (USMC) War Reserve Materiel (WRM) Process Flow, specifically 
during the time building up to the initial invasion of Iraq (2003) in support of Operation 
Iraqi Freedom. Managed by USMC Logistics Command (LOGCOM), the ability of the 
WRM Program to rapidly deliver equipment and supplies in support of major 
contingency operations is critical to the given USMC mission.   
Using historical data from January through March 2003, this project is 
specifically focused on the processes and procedures that take place within LOGCOM to 
identify, procure, package and ship when an item is requested but not maintained in the 
WRM inventory. By conducting a process analysis and using computer modeling, our 
recommendations are focused on improving efficiency and reducing lead time in an effort 
to better support future contingencies.  
 
 vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND ..........................................................1 
A. MOTIVATION ..........................................................................................1 
B. OBJECTIVE ..............................................................................................2 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS .......................................................................2 
D. SCOPE ........................................................................................................2 
E. METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................4 
F. PROJECT OUTLINE ...............................................................................4 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW .....................................................................................5 
A. DOD LOGISTICS OVERVIEW ..............................................................5 
1. Joint Logistics Overview ...............................................................6 
2. Geographic Combatant Commands .............................................6 
3. United States Transportation Command.....................................7 
4. Service Department Logistics .......................................................7 
5. Defense Logistics Agency ..............................................................8 
6. Logistics Command Overview ......................................................8 
B. WAR RESERVE MATERIEL PROGRAM OVERVIEW ...................9 
1. War Reserve Materiel Policy ......................................................10 
2. War Reserve Materiel Program .................................................11 
3. War Reserve Inventory Planning and Withdrawal ..................12 
C. MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND METHODOLOGIES ..............14 
1. Lean Manufacturing ....................................................................15 
2. Six Sigma.......................................................................................17 
3. Lean Six Sigma .............................................................................19 
4. Program Evaluation and Review Technique and Critical 
Path Method .................................................................................20 
5. Variability in Activity Times .......................................................21 
6. Risk Analysis and Crystal Ball Monte-Carlo Simulation ........22 
D. SUMMARY ..............................................................................................23 
III. METHODS AND INPUTS ..................................................................................25 
A. THE DATA ...............................................................................................25 
B. ANALYZING THE DATA .....................................................................28 
1. WRM Program Performance .....................................................28 
2. PERT Analysis .............................................................................29 
3. Crystal Ball Model .......................................................................32 
C. SUMMARY ..............................................................................................35 
 viii 
IV. RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................37 
A. RESULTS USING 2016 PROCESS FLOW ..........................................37 
1. Overview .......................................................................................37 
2. Probability of RDD Being Met....................................................38 
B. RESULTS OF HYPOTHETICAL MODELING .................................41 
1. Generating Hypothetical Scenarios Using LSS Methods .........42 
2. Scenario #1: Controlling Variability ..........................................45 
3. Scenario #2: Controlling Mean Completion Time ....................48 
C. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS .........................................52 
V. FURTHER RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS .........................................55 
A. INVENTORY CONSIDERATION ........................................................55 
1. Inventory/Risk Calculations .......................................................55 
2. Cost/Benefit Analysis of Maintaining Inventory .......................55 
B. TRANSPORTATION VARIABILITY CONSIDERATIONS ............55 
C. ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL RESOURCES ..........................................56 
D. CONTRACT PROCESS ANALYSIS ....................................................56 
E. ITEM TYPE CONSIDERATIONS ........................................................57 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................59 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ...................................................................................63 
 
 ix 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. USMC Expeditionary Focus. Source: HQMC (2014). ................................1 
Figure 2. Project Scope and Background Data, Using Average Flow Times. 
Source: LOGCOM (2003). ..........................................................................3 
Figure 3. Simplified DOD Organization Chart Highlighting the Roles of 
“Provider, Transporter, and Customer.” Adapted from United States 
Department of Defense (2013). ....................................................................5 
Figure 4. Depiction of WRM Sustainment of MAGTF for the First Ninety 
Days of Deployment. Source: HQMC (2016). ..........................................10 
Figure 5. WRM Functions. Source: HQMC (2011). .................................................11 
Figure 6. Withdrawal Timeline (Notional Example). Source: HQMC (2011). ........13 
Figure 7. Withdrawal Assumptions and Constraints. Source: HQMC (2011). .........14 
Figure 8. Principles of Lean Cycle. Source: Lean Enterprise Institute (2016). ........17 
Figure 9. Examples of WRM Program Requests in Support of OIF .........................25 
Figure 10. Items Requested but not Held within the WRM Program Inventory .........26 
Figure 11. Process Flow Chart. Source: LOGCOM (2016). .......................................30 
Figure 12. BetaPERT Distribution of Step F ..............................................................33 
Figure 13. Goodness-of-fit Statistics Tool Results of Step I .......................................34 
Figure 14. Lognormal Distribution for 2003 Data of Step I ........................................34 
Figure 15. Summarized Statistics of Crystal Ball Trials .............................................37 
Figure 16. Distribution of Outputs from Crystal Ball Trials .......................................38 
Figure 17. Probability of Shipping before RDD (42 Days or Less) ............................39 
Figure 18. Probability of Shipping before RDD Minus 10 (32 Days or Less)............40 
Figure 19. Probability of Shipping before RDD Minus 20 (22 Days or Less)............40 
Figure 20. Probability of Shipping before RDD Minus 30 (12 Days or Less)............41 
Figure 21. Tornado Diagram of Expected Delays Using 2016 Inputs ........................42 
 x 
Figure 22. Fishbone Diagram of WRM Program’s Process Flow ..............................43 
Figure 23. Summarized Statistics of Crystal Ball Outputs for Scenario #1 ................46 
Figure 24. Scenario #1 Probability of Shipping before RDD (42 Days or Less) ........46 
Figure 25. Scenario #1 Probability of Shipping before RDD Minus 10 (32 Days 
or Less).......................................................................................................47 
Figure 26. Scenario #1 Probability of Shipping before RDD Minus 20 (22 Days 
or Less).......................................................................................................47 
Figure 27. Scenario #1 Probability of Shipping before RDD Minus 30 (12 Days 
or Less).......................................................................................................48 
Figure 28. Summarized Statistics of Crystal Ball Outputs for Scenario #2 ................49 
Figure 29. Scenario #2 Probability of Shipping before RDD (42 Days or Less) ........50 
Figure 30. Scenario #2 Probability of Shipping before RDD Minus 10 (32 Days 
or Less).......................................................................................................50 
Figure 31. Scenario #2 Probability of Shipping before RDD Minus 20 (22 Days 
or Less).......................................................................................................51 
Figure 32. Scenario #2 Probability of Shipping before RDD Minus 30 (12 Days 
or Less).......................................................................................................52 
Figure 33. Probability Comparison of Timely Deliveries between Original 




LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Classes of Supply. Source: HQMC (2011). ...............................................12 
Table 2. Eight Wastes of Lean. Source: Sarkar (2009), Mindtools (n.d.). ...............16 
Table 3. Principles of Lean. Source: Womack & Jones (1996). ..............................16 
Table 4. The Sigma Scale. Source: Six Sigma Basics (n.d.)....................................18 
Table 5. RDD (All Data) ..........................................................................................28 
Table 6. LOGCOM Delays (All Data) .....................................................................29 
Table 7. Process Analysis Using 2016 Inputs ..........................................................31 
Table 8. Crystal Ball Model with 2016 Interview Inputs ........................................32 
Table 9. Possible Defect Origins in WRM Program’s Process Flow ......................43 
Table 10. Scenario #2 Adjusted Values (Changed Values Highlighted in Blue) ......49 
 
 xii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
C2 Command and Control 
CARF Combat Active Replacement Factor 
CCDR Combatant Commander 
CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
CMC Commandant of the Marine Corps 
CoC Chain-of-Command 
COCOM Combatant Command (command authority) 
CONUS Continental United States 
CPM Critical Path Method 
CSA Combat Support Agency 
DC Deputy Commandant 
DLA Defense Logistics Agency 
DMAIC Define, Measure, Analyze, Improve, and Control 
DOD Department of Defense 
DON Department of the Navy 
DOS Days of Supply 
DPMO Defects per Million Opportunities 
EF21 Expeditionary Force 21 
GCC Geographic Combatant Command 
HQMC Headquarters Marine Corps 
I&L Installations and Logistics 
ID/IQ Indefinite Delivery; Indefinite Quantity 
IM Item Manager 
LOGCOM Logistics Command; officially COMMARCORLOGCOM 
LSS Lean Six Sigma 
MAGTF Marine Air-Ground Task Force 
MCDP Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 
MRO Materiel Request Order 
 xiv 
NSN National Stock Number 
OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom 
OPLAN Operations Plan 
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 
P&R Programs and Resources (HQMC) 
PERT Program Evaluation and Review Technique 
RDD Requested Delivery Date 
SABRS Standard Accounting Budgeting Reporting System 
SecDef Secretary of Defense 
SOP Standard Operating Procedures 
USTRANSCOM US Transportation Command 
USMC United States Marine Corps 
WRM War Reserve Materiel 
WRMRF War Reserve Materiel Requirement Force-held 
WRMRI War Reserve Materiel Requirement In-stores 
WRS War Reserve System 
WRWP  War Reserve Withdrawal Plan 
 xv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
We would like to thank our family and friends who have supported us throughout 
our careers. Additionally, we would like to thank our advisors and the faculty of the 
Naval Postgraduate School for the effort they put into our education and research. We 
would also like to extend a particularly warm thank-you to the staff at LOGCOM; their 
willingness to take time out of their busy schedules made this report possible.  
 
 xvi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 1 
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
A. MOTIVATION 
Since 11 September 2001, the United States military has been faced with 
enormous challenges, ranging from simultaneous wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Arab 
Spring resulting in collapsed governments across the Middle East, and a new global terror 
threat known as the Islamic State, just to name a few. Add in humanitarian aid missions 
for natural disasters, the internal friction of budget cuts, and manpower reductions, and 
now military planners are looking for ways to do more with less.  
For the Marine Corps, the fundamental quandary today is how to get “the right 
force, in the right place, at the right time” (HQMC, 2014). This challenge becomes more 
difficult as global security changes at an ever increasing pace and the resources needed to 
respond become harder to obtain. Expeditionary Force 21 (EF21), published in 2014 by 
Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) focuses on realigning the force to meet the 
challenges of the future while maintaining the expeditionary culture shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.  USMC Expeditionary Focus. Source: HQMC (2014). 
The Marine Corps has designed the War Reserve Materiel (WRM) Program to aid 
in the fast, austere and lethal response to global contingencies. Managed by Marine Corps 
Logistics Command (LOGCOM), they try and answer the question: Are we storing the 
right equipment, in the right places, at the right quantities in order to rapidly and 
accurately support the force? 
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B. OBJECTIVE 
The stockpiles of equipment and supplies the Marine Corps have strategically 
positioned provides a response capability to any crisis. Former Secretary of Defense 
(SecDef) Chuck Hagel has stated “The Marine Corps’ inherent agility, crisis response 
capabilities, and maritime focus make it well suited to carry out many priority missions 
under the President’s defense strategy” (HQMC, 2014). In order to maintain those 
capabilities, the Marine Corps must continually analyze and update the war reserve 
stocks being held around the world.   
This research project analyzes historical usage data from the WRM Program’s 
support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in 2003. Our focus is to conduct a process 
improvement analysis internal to LOGCOM and our objective is focused on reducing 
delay time to ensure Required Delivery Dates (RDD) of critical equipment into theater 
are met with higher frequency. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In order to focus our research onto a process improvement analysis, we developed 
specific questions focused only on instances in which an item was requested from the 
WRM Program but not held within the inventory. The three major questions we sought to 
answer include: 
1. When an item is requested from the WRM Program but not held in the 
inventory, what are the internal procedures that take place to acquire that 
item? 
2. How much administrative delay do those procedures create? 
3. How often does the delay contribute to missing a RDD? 
D. SCOPE 
Highlighted by Figure 2, the scope of this research project solely focuses on the 
internal procedures of LOGCOM when providing items from within the WRM Program. 
Specifically, we are looking at those processes that occur when an item is requested but 
not held within the WRM Program inventory.   
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Figure 2.  Project Scope and Background Data, Using Average Flow Times. 
Source: LOGCOM (2003). 
Based on data from 2003 in support of OIF, when an item was requested from the 
WRM Program and not held in the inventory, LOGCOM was given on average 42.31 
days to meet the RDD in those cases. Knowing that those 42.31 days also includes 
transportation time, we aim to analyze and provide recommendations on how to shorten 
the administrative delays caused within LOGCOM in order to increase the likelihood that 
RDD will be met. This project will not attempt to analyze transportation timelines by 
United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) as that is outside the direct 






This research uses simulation and Lean Six Sigma (LSS) Process Improvement as 
a methodology. As discussed above, our analysis showed there is a significant amount of 
time consumed by what LOGCOM has described as administrative delays. Using that 
information, we have received detailed input from Marines and Department of Defense 
(DOD) civilians that know the system and are familiar with the processes that must take 
place. With their inputs (Optimistic, Pessimistic, and Most Likely) on how long each 
process takes, we built a Crystal Ball simulation model in order to conduct a Six Sigma 
Process Improvement analysis.   
Our initial data collection was coordinated by LOGCOM personnel. It provided 
us with an insider perspective to how the system was utilized in 2003 during the buildup 
to OIF. This initial data and conversations with LOGCOM led us to focusing on the 
administrative delays. Further data was then collected from LOGCOM personnel known 
as Item Managers who are directly involved in the processes that take place when an item 
is requested but not held in the inventory. We relied on their subject matter expertise to 
conduct our process improvement analysis.  
The Crystal Ball program allowed us to run various simulations in an effort to 
uncover the most likely factors contributing to missing RDD. The output functions of this 
software add strength to our recommendations by allowing us to provide LOGCOM with 
hard data resulting from thousands of simulated runs.  
F. PROJECT OUTLINE 
This report is organized as follows:  Chapter II reviews the topics relevant to our 
analysis including Crystal Ball software, Program Evaluation and Review Technique 
(PERT), Critical Path Method (CPM), and LSS methodologies. Chapter III is focused on 
collection and analysis of our data to include the building of Crystal Ball models for 
simulation. Chapter IV offers analysis of our findings and the recommendations we offer 
to LOGCOM. Chapter V recommends ideas for further research. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. DOD LOGISTICS OVERVIEW 
Acquiring and supplying materiel to deployed forces is a complicated process. 
While we conducted our analysis on LOGCOM’s role in this system, we thought it was 
important to familiarize ourselves with the overarching process to better understand the 
factors may facilitate or hinder LOGCOM’s ability to execute its mission. Here we will 
discuss the top-level organizations and their roles in the delivery of materiel to the 
warfighter. 
As this is a Process Flow topic, we will simplify the depiction of the process by 
assigning roles: the “provider,” “transporter,” and “customer.” Additionally, we will 
introduce other organizations, alternative providers, that may be used for orders the 
primary provider is unable to fill. This distinction is important, as neither the providers 
nor the wholesalers have manufacturing capabilities and must source existing materiel or 
generate new orders. Figure 3 illustrates how each role fits in the organizational structure 
within the DOD. 
 
Figure 3.  Simplified DOD Organization Chart Highlighting the Roles of 
“Provider, Transporter, and Customer.” Adapted from United States 
Department of Defense (2013).  
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Within this hierarchical structure, many parallel organizational chains must 
operate laterally to receive, source, and deliver order requests. We will now discuss an 
overview of DOD logistics while introducing each of the organizations that fulfill these 
roles in order to familiarize the reader with the roles and responsibilities of LOGCOM 
and how it fits in the larger process. 
1. Joint Logistics Overview 
As depicted in Figure 3, the “President and SecDef exercise authority, direction, 
and control of the Armed Forces through two distinct branches of the chain of C2 
[command and control]” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013). For operational direction, the 
SecDef uses the Combatant Commanders (CCDR) and the forces within their Geographic 
Combatant Command (GCC). For any other purposes, the SecDef will operate via the 
service departments, such as the Department of the Navy (DON). In the case of logistics, 
this includes the acquisition and provision of items to their respective service 
departments. This command structure is important to note as forces transition from their 
parent commands to GCCs and the logistics train is altered. 
2. Geographic Combatant Commands 
When operationally ready units transition to a GCC, the CCDR assumes 
Combatant Command authority over those units and they are retained for use in 
accomplishing the CCDR’s mission. Put simply, they belong to the CCDR and the new 
Chain-of-Command (CoC) is responsible for sustaining the unit, typical for all military 
units, assets, and installations within its geographic theater. However, when a USMC unit 
first arrives in theater, it is doctrinal for the war reserve to support the unit for only 90 
days before the CCDR designates theater support agencies to assume the responsibility of 
logistical support to the unit. Thus, the “customer” is any given USMC unit that sought 
support from the WRS as they deploy to a GCC.   
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3. United States Transportation Command  
In this simplified model, the chief “transporter” task belongs to USTRANSCOM, 
a Functional Combatant Command. USTRANSCOM “plans, coordinates, directs, and 
monitors movement and deployment of forces and materiel necessary to meet military 
objectives. [It] assures integration of components supporting plans for common-user lift 
of forces and materiel for contingencies and general war” (USTRANSCOM, 2016). Its 
role and authority as a Functional Combatant Command is crucial as it places 
USTRANSCOM on “equal footing” with the GCC, its customers, to prevent abuse of the 
command’s capabilities and assets. 
USTRANSCOM has several notable Component Commands that provide various 
logistics functions for the movement of personnel and materiel: 
• Surface Deployment and Distribution Command; Army 
• Military Sealift Command; Navy 
• Air Mobility Command; Airforce 
These Component Commands are manned by their respective services, and each can be 
expected to support joint efforts, according to the needs of the supported GCC. 
USTRANSCOM must work with the provider and the customer to determine the most 
efficient and timely distribution of resources and personnel.  
While it is important to understand the relationship between each of major players 
in the Process Flow, the timeline of materiel transportation by USTRANSCOM will not 
be considered in our analysis. Once materiel has been relinquished from the WRM 
inventory for movement by USTRANSCOM, LOGCOM has no further influence on the 
timeliness of the delivery to the customer. Thus, due to the scope of our problem, we will 
focus solely on the portions of the overall delivery that LOGCOM can affect. 
4. Service Department Logistics 
Each service department has their own structure for all functions of logistical 
efforts; thus, we will focus on LOGCOM under HQMC as the “provider” in this model. 
When a deploying unit makes an order request to be fulfilled by the war reserve, 
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LOGCOM will seek to satisfy it from their inventory or issue a request to a different 
provider, such as the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). LOGCOM will be addressed in 
more detail under Section II-A-6: Logistics Command Overview. 
5. Defense Logistics Agency  
DLA, also noted in Figure 3, is a Combat Support Agency (CSA) under the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Under many circumstances, DLA could very well 
serve as an alternative provider in the big picture model. Indeed, when the WRM 
Program is unable to fill an order from their inventory, LOGCOM will attempt to 
leverage DLA to meet the need, and it cannot directly influence the process from that 
point until receipt. This is significant as the order and receipt from DLA contributes to 
the WRS timeline for delivery, which will be addressed as we examine the Process Flow 
of orders’ receipt to fulfillment.    
6. Logistics Command Overview 
The USMC takes the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of logistics into 
consideration and must be able to deploy self-reliant Marine Air-Ground Task Forces 
(MAGTFs). The strategic level generates, sustains, and provides for forces capable of 
deployment. The tactical level maintains and moves deployed forces within the area of 
responsibility. The operational level is the realm that bridges the two, using all available 
logistics efforts to meet the needs of forces as they conduct operations theater-wide 
(HQMC, 1999). LOGCOM and the WRM Program are primarily involved in strategic 
and operational levels to facilitate the tactical execution.  
The focus of our analysis is LOGCOM’s role as the provider. The WRM Program 
is the method used to provide sustainment capability to deployed Marine units and a 
principal enabler in accomplishing LOGCOM’s mission. At the strategic level, the WRM 
Program determines sustainment requirements to identify appropriate levels of materiel. 
At the operational level, it plans for sustainment of forward units and execute its portion 
of an Operations Plan (OPLAN) if called upon. OPLANS serve as broad plans to give 
structure to roles of all players in the event of a contingency. A portion of an OPLAN is 
reserved for a War Reserve Withdrawal Plan (WRWP). These WRWPs denote the levels 
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of sustainment required from the reserve, determined by high-level planning efforts. In 
short, the WRM Program’s strategic level contributions include planning and sourcing, 
while those at the operational level are the actual execution of the WRWP or 
modifications thereof.   
LOGCOM falls under the Installations and Logistics (I&L) agency under HQMC. 
While it is a very complex process, LOGCOM sources and maintains inventory levels of 
materiel in accordance with the aforementioned plans. Using the War Reserve System 
(WRS), LOGCOM can use this interface to search its inventory and commit materiel to a 
requesting customer, should it exist in their inventory. Theoretically, it should match the 
WRWP; however, real-world contingencies often do not perfectly mirror the envisioned 
ones or developing requirements. If the necessary materiel is not in the WRS, LOGCOM 
uses the system to initiate an order to outside agencies, such as DLA. 
B. WAR RESERVE MATERIEL PROGRAM OVERVIEW 
Ultimately, the WRM Program’s process seeks to sustain a MAGTF.   Within the 
program, the WRS is used to calculate the requirements for this effort. The WRS is a 
collection of software, procedures, and inventory management systems that facilitate 
compliance with WRM Policy and LOGCOM’s mission of assisting the deployed 
MAGTF.   
Depending on the MAGTF’s task organization, it is classified into a type of task 
force largely correlating to its size and the level of leadership assigned to its command. 
These types, from smallest to largest, are Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU), Marine 
Expeditionary Brigades (MEB), and Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF). Each of these 
types is capable of self-sustainment for the first fifteen, thirty, and sixty days of 
deployment, respectively. After these time periods have expired, the WRM Program may 
be expected to source the supply effort. 
The WRM Program’s support to these MAGTFs is doctrinally planned to last up 
to ninety days upon the MAGTF’s arrival into theater. WRM Days of Supply (DOS) are 
the units of measurement to one day’s worth of sustainment for a given MAGTF. 
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Regardless of the MAGTF’s self-sustainment capabilities, the GCC becomes responsible 
for the sustainment sourcing on day ninety, depicted in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4.  Depiction of WRM Sustainment of MAGTF for the First Ninety Days 
of Deployment. Source: HQMC (2016). 
1. War Reserve Materiel Policy 
The WRM Policy is over-arching guidance designed to ensure the USMC can 
“provide sufficient ground materiel to sustain the Operating Force (OPFOR) from 
inception to the establishment of the theater support capability” (Commandant of the 
Marine Corps, 2011). It is set by the referenced order, which is in turn guided by DOD 
Instructions concerning war reserve requirements (DOD Instruction 3110.06). As ordered 
by the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), the Deputy Commandant Installations 
and Logistics (DC I&L) maintains the policy directives that guide the program. Within 
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this agency, the DOS are calculated for various scenarios and units based off GCC 
Marine Corps component needs and other variables.  
LOGCOM, as directed by policies such as the one above, maintains and reports 
on the “materiel status and changes in War Reserve Materiel Requirement Force-held 
(WRMRF) [and] War Reserve Materiel Requirement In-stores (WRMRI)” (Commandant 
of the Marine Corps, 2011). These are inventory levels held by Marine Corps forces and 
the actual WRM Program itself, respectively. LOGCOM is notably responsible for WRS 
file maintenance and reviewing the WRM Program, among many other requirements 
outlined in the policy order. 
2. War Reserve Materiel Program 
“The WRM Program provides guidance for the computation, acquisition and 
management of ground materiel required to sustain operating forces across a spectrum of 
missions and contingencies” (HQMC, 2011). It is the method by which the USMC 
complies with the aforementioned policy. The program defines six WRM Functions from 
inception to theater support capability, depicted in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5.  WRM Functions. Source: HQMC (2011). 
These functions “are the means by which the Marine Corps provides for sufficient 
materiel, within the limits of acceptable risk, to sustain operating forces from inception to 
the establishment of the theater support capability” (HQMC, 2011). While each of these 
functions is critical and interrelated to the others, our analysis will primarily reside in the 
Distribution function. It is important to realize that the “computations [of sustainment 
requirements] do not address distribution within the battlespace, which is a transportation 
function” (HQMC, 2016). Distribution, in this sense, is concerned with the operational 
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level of logistics as it seeks to support units arriving and operating in their designated 
theater. 
Additionally, external Sourcing has a role to play as well when the WRMRI 
cannot satisfy an order with its inventory and must source externally. This differs from 
acquisition, which is associated with designing, manufacturing, and maintaining new or 
updated items. The remaining functions certainly have a role to play in the timeline of 
sustaining deployed forces, but affect transportation and other variables not directly 
associated with the order Process Flow and are outside the scope of this research. 
3. War Reserve Inventory Planning and Withdrawal 
When calculating requirements to be sourced and retained in the WRM Program, 
the WRS is used to track quantities and incorporate variables such as climate, unit size, 
operational phase, and mission requirements. While not unique to the WRM Program, 
items are organized into classes, listed in Table 1. 
Table 1.   Classes of Supply. Source: HQMC (2011).  
Class Description 
Class I Subsistence (Food, Rations, and Water) 
Class II Clothing and Individual Items 
Class III Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants; Including Bulk Ground Fuel 
Class IV Lumber, Field Fortification and Construction Materiel 
Class V Ammunition 
Class VI Personal Demand Items 
Class VII End Items 
Class VIII Medical supplies 
Class IX Repair Parts 
Class X Materiel to Support Nonstandard Military Operations 
 
Using the previously-mentioned WRM Functions, WRM sustainment planning at 
the strategic level involves many agencies and working groups to determine the 
requirements. At the operational level, the WRM Program seeks to support deployed 
MAGTFs and the CCDR OPLANs. When an actual WRWP must be executed, the 
sustainment requirements should be sourced in accordance with the planning inputs. The 
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requested items, or WRM Materiel Request Orders (MROs), are released from the 
inventory, or “withdrawn,” and can then be transported to the MAGTF via 
USTRANSCOM.   
The notional timeline “to support planning purposes only” is depicted in Figure 6 
(HQMC, 2011). While it is concerned with orders that the WRMRI has on hand, there is 
relevant information in the early steps. We noted that “HQ Admin/Funding Actions 
Complete” occurs by approximately Day 13. These first thirteen days encompass Steps A 
through H in our Process Flow; the WRM Programs distribution responsibilities from 
“Release Actions” up to “Complete Embarkment at [Aerial/Surface Port of Embarkation] 
A/SPOE” would only be applicable if the item were in the WRMRI. As we are concerned 
with items that were not on-hand and procured, the Inner Service Agency satisfying the 
order would be responsible for its transportation to the A/SPOE, where it is turned over to 
USTRANSCOM (HQMC, 2011).  
 




The portion of Process Flow wherein the Source of Supply is assigning Shipping 
Status Codes, Step I, is a departure from the timeline depicted Figure 6. Another notable 
difference is that the average RDD of orders from the 2003 data was 42 days, while the 
notional Withdrawal Timeline depicts 122 days for planning purposes, with 85 of those 
being consumed by “Actions associated with the WRM Distribution Function.” This 
demonstrates a dramatic departure from the notional timeline, but still offers some insight 
into the desired duration of WRM Distribution tasks in proportion to an entire realistic 
Withdrawal Timeline. There are important “assumptions and constraints associated with 
[the] Withdrawal process,” depicted in Figure 7. A particularly noteworthy one is that the 
“administrative actions are conducted in the minimum amount of time required” 
(HQMC, 2011).   
 
Figure 7.  Withdrawal Assumptions and Constraints. Source: 
HQMC (2011). 
C. MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND METHODOLOGIES 
After reviewing the WRM Program and its role, we will examine management 
practices for efficiency improvement. We seek techniques that may be applicable for 
analysis and recommendations for the WRM Programs process flow, and have identified 
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several that could serve this goal, discussed in the remainder of this chapter. While 
several of these have been developed for business practices, we determined their potential 
due to the parallel process between the war reserve process and that of large, commercial 
organizations. These organizations continue to implement theories and management 
practices to reduce redundancies, waste, and delays to increase overall improvement 
processes and efficiencies. Excess volume and lengthy processes increase delays and 
costs. Scholars have developed concepts, tools, and methodologies to maximize 
efficiencies in products, services, and delivery schedules. Below are methodologies 
organizations have implemented to reduce defects, eliminate non-value added steps, and 
accurately predict optimal results, each potentially benefitting the WRM Program.     
1. Lean Manufacturing  
The theory of lean manufacturing, the elimination of waste, became fully 
incorporated into the manufacturing process by Henry Ford in 1913. Ford’s production 
flow was generated from the creation of an assembly line as he was able to manufacture 
and assemble various components in an expedited manner. This quickly reduced time and 
costs as compared to traditional manufacturing practices. Kiichiro Toyoda, founder of 
Toyota, carefully examined Ford’s practices to further enhance both variety and 
fabrication flow as he focused heavily on the entire production system as opposed to just 
a single step. Toyoda adjusted their manufacturing cycle to reduce excess volume and 
conjoined steps to increase the flow of information.   
Although practiced for years, the theory of lean manufacturing was first cited in 
1990 by James Womack, Daniel Jones, and Daniel Ross in “The Machine That Changed 
the World.” Their citation introduced all industries to a new theory only practiced by 
select organizations. The “lean manufacturing approach is based on finding efficiencies 
and removing wasteful steps that don’t add value to the end product” (Mindtools, n.d.). 
Within the lean approach, the eight areas of waste are identified in Table 2: 
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Table 2.   Eight Wastes of Lean. Source: Sarkar (2009), Mindtools (n.d.). 
Transportation Unnecessarily moving products not required to perform the process 
Inventory Finished products not processed 
Motion Equipment or employees’ movement that adds zero value 
Waiting Time spent waiting for follow on production steps; delays or interruptions  
Overproduction Producing unnecessary products; products not demanded 
Over Processing Lengthy approach to a simple problem 
Defects/Scrap Errors or mistakes; effort required to inspect and fix defected products  
Un-utilized People Employees not employed to full potential  
 
By eliminating waste, organizations can reduce costs and production time while 
simultaneously improving overall quality (Apte & Kang, 2006). Lean approach theory 
has been widely accepted and applied to various industries to include the military, as well 
engineering and automobile manufacturers. Companies seek to align the production cycle 
to achieve maximum value and efficiency. The five lean principles are described in 
Table 3 and depicted cyclically in Figure 8. 
Table 3.   Principles of Lean. Source: Womack & Jones (1996). 
Value Specify the value from the standpoint of the end customer by product family. 
Value 
Stream 
Identify all the steps in the value stream for each product family, 
eliminating whenever possible those steps that do not create value. 
Flow Make the value-creating steps occur in tight sequence so the product will flow smoothly toward the customer. 
Pull As flow is introduced, let customers pull value from the next upstream activity. 
Perfection Begin the process again and continue it until a state of perfection is reached in which perfect value is created with no waste.  
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The concept of lean thinking determines those steps, activities, and resources that 
add value. Any additional step not adding value is detrimental to the production, 
considered waste, and must be removed. From the client’s perspective, customers will 
pay for any action or process that adds value to fulfill their requirements (Mindtools, 
n.d.). The lean approach is a theory that must constantly respond to unforeseen changes 
and adapt accordingly to properly manage value added steps and remove waste. Before 
the next step in the cycle can begin, the prior event must be accomplished. If the event 
cannot be completed, the organization must retreat to the previous step or the beginning 
as depicted in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8.  Principles of Lean Cycle. Source: Lean Enterprise Institute (2016). 
While the WRM Program is not a manufacturing organization, the concept of lean 
manufacturing introduces management philosophies that are nested in more applicable 
techniques to follow. 
2. Six Sigma 
Lean manufacturing tackled problems from a quantitative standpoint, but 
organizations wanted to qualitatively measure production cycles, increase overall 
efficiencies, and reduce costs. Six Sigma’s management practice aims to distribute near-
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perfect products and services by reducing defects in their products or services (Six Sigma 
Basics, n.d.). Defects include product costs, quality of services or products, and delivery 
performance. For every defect in the service or product, companies lose money by losing 
customers, repeating steps, wasting time, or replacing parts.   
Bill Smith, Motorola Engineer and quality assurance chief, wanted to measure 
defects on a micro level to increase profits and improve service and product quality. 
Smith wanted to measure the defects per million opportunities (DPMO) instead of the 
traditional method of defect in thousands of opportunities (“The History of Six Sigma,” 
n.d.).  
Sigma measures the standard deviations, variations or dispersion in a dataset, 
from perfection. The name Six Sigma was coined as a Sigma level of Six results in near 
perfection as there are only 3.4 DPMO. Most companies are currently operating around 
Sigma level Three to Four resulting in roughly a quarters worth of lost revenue due to 
existing defects (Six Sigma Basics, n.d.). The Sigma Scale in Table 4 shows the 
relationship between Sigma levels and their respective defects per million:   
Table 4.   The Sigma Scale. Source: Six Sigma Basics (n.d.). 
Sigma Percent Defective 
Defects per 
Million 
1 69% 691,462 
2 31% 308,538 
3 6.70% 66,807 
4 0.62% 6,210 
5 0.02% 233 
6 0.00% 3.4 




Six Sigma utilizes an improvement process to advance existing practices known 
as Define, Measure, Analyze, Improve, and Control (DMAIC). DMAIC helps 
organizations improve processes where each phase is interconnected with the previous 
phase and the next phase (Apte & Kang, 2008). 
Through a data analysis approach, Six Sigma provides sufficient savings for large 
organizations by removing the root causes of products or service defects. Appropriate 
oversight and quality control measures can reduce costs, improve overall quality, and 
increase revenue. Similar to the lean approach cycle, Six Sigma is a cyclic effort that 
must be adaptive to unexpected changes.   
In order for Six Sigma to become effective throughout the organization, key roles 
are assigned by leaders. These individuals, based on the extent of their training, hold 
hierarchal billets and responsibilities at various levels to promote and implement the 
principles of Six Sigma throughout the organization (“Six Sigma,” 2016). 
3. Lean Six Sigma  
Six Sigma and lean manufacturing have been applied and practiced unconnectedly 
for years. Practitioners have blended both methodologies to analytically remove waste 
while utilizing Six Sigma’s DMAIC phases. LSS’s intentions are to eliminate waste, 
reduce defected products or services, and improve processes. LSS “drives customer 
satisfaction and bottom-line results by reducing variation, waste, and cycle time, while 
promoting the use of work standardization and flow, thereby creating a competitive 
advantage” (“What is Six Sigma?,” 2009). Similar to Six Sigma, LSS seeks to identify a 
problem, analyze appropriately, and successfully implement a solution. Innovative 
thinking can help implement valid practices to minimize waste and defects.   
Lean and Six Sigma methodologies have been successful in improving business 
operations. However, in order to be better equipped, LSS can help the organization 
confront more unique problems and broaden their approach to waste elimination. 
Organizations employing LSS will reap larger benefits than mastering either Six Sigma 
or lean manufacturing.    
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4. Program Evaluation and Review Technique and Critical Path Method 
The previous concepts certainly appealed to manufacturing, profit-centric 
organizations, but other methodologies explore process improvement in a more general 
manner. PERT and CPM will likely be applicable to our analysis of the WRM Program 
process flow. These practices seek to identify issues that limit the speed and efficiency of 
accomplishing an objective, such as the WRM Program fulfilling an order.   
PERT was established in the 1950s by an operations research team consisting of 
the United States Navy, Lockheed, and contractor Booz, Allen, and Hamilton during the 
development of Polaris-Submarine weapon system and Fleet Ballistic Missile capability 
(“Program Evaluation and Review Technique,” 2016). CPM was also developed in the 
1950s by Morgan Walker and James Kelley (“Critical Path Method,” 2016). Walker and 
Morgan credited the development of CPM from the fundamentals of PERT. PERT and 
CPM, although independently developed, are nearly identical. Both methodologies focus 
on project management, scheduling, and concentrate on a vital critical path in a network 
of tasks. A critical path is the longest path to project completion, and is generated from a 
system of events performed in sequential order.  
PERT, as a management tool, identifies all critical events, interrelations between 
different events, times to complete each event, and minimum time to project completion. 
A graphic provides managers with a visual representation of the sequence of events or 
those actions that can be independently completed. After analyzing the network of events 
and associated time to complete the task, organizations can assign additional resources to 
those steps causing delays. The critical path “is a sequence of individual activities of a 
project that must be finished on schedule so that the whole project is completed on time. 
Activities along the path cannot begin until a predecessor activity is complete” (Kielmas, 
n.d.). Similar to PERT, CPM computes the longest path of schedule steps to project 
completion. The process recognizes both critical and non-critical events to prevent 
bottlenecks and wasted time. Often, a flowchart will depict the relationships between 
tasks and the expected time to complete each step and entire process.   
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5. Variability in Activity Times 
Each activity or step within the given PERT or CPM requires three estimates to 
complete that given task. Estimates of the three durations are as follows (OR-AS, 2011): 
• Optimistic Time Estimate (a): Shortest possible time to complete the given 
task if all things go according to plan. 
• Most-likely Time (m): Under given circumstances, the most likely time 
the task can be completed. 
• Pessimistic Time Estimate (b): Longest possible time to complete the 
given task with unfavorable circumstances.  
The three estimated durations provide a weighted average (expected time), 
standard deviation, and variance. The expected time is the “likeliness that the real activity 
duration lies close to the realistic estimate (m) is larger than the likeliness that it lies 
closer to the two extreme values a or b” (OR-AS, 2011). Both standard deviation, the 
amount of dispersion or variation from the mean, and the variance, the squared deviation 
from the mean, are necessary for a beta distributed data set. If all activities in the duration 
are beta distributed, “the general principle is that the standard deviation assumes that 
almost all observations will lie between the extreme values a and b” (OR-AS, 2011). 
Given the three estimated durations, the expected time, standard deviation and variance 
formulas are: 
Expected Time: Time (t) = (a + 4m + b) / 6 
Standard Deviation: Standard Deviation (sd) = (b – a) / 6 
Variance of Times: Variance (v) = [(b – a)] / 6] ^2 
PERT utilizes probability distribution for all estimated event times. This allows 
for variability within the given data set and estimated times. However, CPM assumes the 
estimated times are fixed and variability does not exist. During the execution of a War 
Reserve Drawdown, the duration of each task will not be given as a fixed time. The three 
estimates for each duration will include variability given the bureaucratic procedures 
within LOGCOM.     
Research has shown and questions have been raised about the limitations that may 
exist in the use of the beta distribution. With beta distribution estimates, the optimistic 
and pessimistic task times are accepted as end points and so we acknowledge that we 
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could be underestimating risk, most critically in our pessimistic times. As Klastorin 
states, it is difficult for individuals to provide accurate estimates of task durations they 
have never experienced.  “This requires the decision maker to not consider possible 
catastrophic events when making this estimate.   Thus, the manager/expert must make an 
accurate appraisal for hundreds or thousands of tasks of the worst time that could occur 
under ‘normal’ conditions” (Klastorin, 2004). With additional time and access to the 
LOGCOM procedures, we would recommend more detailed interviews and research by 
asking managers/experts to provide fractile estimates for each task (Klastorin, 2004); 
however, for this research we proceed using the beta distribution.   
6. Risk Analysis and Crystal Ball Monte-Carlo Simulation 
Risk can be defined as “the probability of occurrence of an undesirable outcome. 
Thus, risk is related to the uncertainty associated with things that one cannot control and 
the results of this uncertainty” (Evans & Olson, 2002). Further, risk analysis can be stated 
as “a comprehensive understanding and awareness of the risk associated with a particular 
variable of interest” (Hertz & Thomas, 1983). In our research on the WRM Process Flow, 
the particular variable that we have identified is time and the ability of the Marine Corps 
to deliver supplies within a given timeline. Through research and simulation, we look to 
identify the contributing factors to the schedule risk and offer recommendations on how 
to mitigate delays in the delivery process.   
As Evans and Olson (2002, p. 114) state, “the challenge to risk analysts is to 
frame the output of risk analysis procedures in a manner that makes sense to the manager 
and provides clear insight into the problem,” suggesting that simulation has many 
advantages. To aid us in our spreadsheet simulation, we will utilize the Crystal Ball 
software which automates and simplifies the complex and tedious steps in the Monte-
Carlo simulation process. Sampling from a distribution, replicating model results and 
most importantly tools to address risk related questions are all benefits to using the 
Crystal Ball program (Evans & Olson, 2002). 
  
 23 
With our goal of recommending process improvements in order to reduce internal 
timelines of LOGCOM and the WRS, we believe that conducting simulation using 
Crystal Ball will be advantageous for the following reasons (Balakrishnan, Render, & 
Stair, 2013): 
• Flexibility: When properly implemented, the model can be made to 
accommodate several changes to the problem scenario. 
• Allows for What-If Scenarios: We will have the flexibility to run the 
simulation many times trying several different policy decisions within a 
matter of minutes.  
• No interference with the real-world system: With the data we have 
collected, we will be able to experiment using the model and not 
impacting real-world WRM Process Flow. 
• Replication: Using Crystal Ball software will allow us to run thousands of 
replications, increasing the validity and usefulness of our outputs.  
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter introduced a broad overview of the DOD logistics system and its 
complexities. The focus was then narrowed onto the Marine Corps, LOGCOM and 
ultimately the WRM Program and its role in support of contingencies around the world.   
The final section of this chapter discusses business management practices and 
methodologies that we intend to use in our analysis of the WRM Program. We will use 
computer simulation to conduct a schedule risk analysis centered on meeting RDD (i.e., 
Time). Using those results we will implement the principles of LSS and Process 
Improvement to reduce the risk of missing deadlines. 
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III. METHODS AND INPUTS 
A. THE DATA 
With support from the personnel at LOGCOM who manage the WRM Program, 
we were able to access historical usage data from their computer database. The general 
time frame of data we received was between the period of January and March 2003. This 
time period is significant in that it coincides with the Marine Corps build up in the 
Middle East in preparation for the invasion of Iraq signaling the start of OIF. This was 
the last time the WRM Program was utilized in support of a significant ground war, and 
so we feel confident that this data sample is an accurate reflection on the WRM 
Program’s performance.  
The first data set we were given included over 40,000 lines of individual orders 
placed for various pieces of equipment or supplies. These orders ranged anywhere from 
principle end items to maintenance parts, including entire trucks down to a pair of boots. 
Figure 9 shows a simplified example of two individual order requests to better explain the 
type of information we were provided.   
 
Figure 9.  Examples of WRM Program Requests in Support of OIF 
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The first line item is for a Rifle, 5.56 Millimeter with a quantity of 1,716. The 
date of “064” signifies the RDD based on a Julian Date Calendar. The second line item is 
for a Machine Gun, 7.62 Millimeter with a RDD of “105.”  The order dates are embedded 
within the Document Numbers, and are shown in more detail in Figure 9.    
Using the dates provided within the order information (highlighted in red within 
Figure 9) we were then able to calculate the time LOGCOM was given per order to have 
that item in theater (Required Delivery Date – Order Date = Time Permitted for 
Delivery). In the case of these two examples they had 48 days and 46 days for the rifle 
and machine gun, respectively. This was valuable information for us, as it quickly gave 
us a starting point from which to grade LOGCOM on its performance. However, 
knowing that part of that timeline was utilized by USTRANSCOM for the physical 
shipment of the item, we had to dig deeper to figure out what part of this timeline 
LOGCOM was actually responsible for, and potentially able to control.  
The second data set that we analyzed included all the orders that were requested 
from the WRMRI, but not held within the inventory. Within the scope of this project, it is 
this set of data that provided us with a way to judge LOGCOM on their control of their 
processes. Using Figure 10, we will explain the metrics we used in our research. 
 
Figure 10.  Items Requested but not Held within the WRM Program Inventory 
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The two items shown in Figure 10 were pulled from over 12,000 individual line 
items. Each of the 12,000+ lines represent individual orders for equipment or repair parts 
that were not currently held within the WRM Program’s inventory. In this case we 
purposely displayed two orders for identical items. The repair part “Connector Body, 
Plug” with the exact same Stock Number was requested on at least two separate 
occasions as we have shown. Utilizing Julian Date formats, we were then able to begin 
building a timeline to determine how much time LOGCOM was consuming with respect 
to meeting RDD. This becomes increasingly interesting when identical items show 
significant variation in procurement times, as this example does. 
Going step-by-step for the first line item, we see that a “Connector Body, Plug” 
was ordered on Julian Date “023” with a quantity of “00001.”  Finally, we see that in this 
particular case, LOGCOM did not receive confirmation of shipment until day “100,” 
despite the RDD being registered as “064.”  To summarize this single item, it was 
ordered on day “023” but was not shipped until day “100” resulting in a total delay of 77 
days under LOGCOM control, which is significant considering there were only 41 days 
given to meet RDD. For this order of a “Connector Body, Plug” we have found it was 
ready for shipment 36 days after RDD.  
Looking at the second line we see that the same item, in the same quantity was 
ordered on day “055,” or 32 days after the first line item. Applying the same math 
explained above we discover the delay under LOGCOM is only 43 days, with a total of 
50 days given to meet RDD. And so for this order of a “Connector Body, Plug” we have 
the item ready for shipment seven days before RDD. We can say these are “crossed 
orders” in the sense that order in line two was placed later but shipped sooner. So, first-
come-first-served priority is not being maintained (Bashyam & Fu, 1998).   
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B. ANALYZING THE DATA 
1. WRM Program Performance 
In the section above we have two identical items, ordered in identical quantities 
with drastically different procurement timelines. The first item shipped 36 days after 
RDD and the second item shipped seven days before RDD. Obviously shipment after 
RDD is a failure, but what we could not measure was how far in advance of RDD should 
LOGCOM have a shipment confirmation in order to be considered successful in meeting 
RDD. It should be reiterated that the scope of the research does not include 
USTRANSCOM and so the timelines for shipment are still an unknown variable even 
though they are factored into the RDD. When we present the results of our data in 
Chapter four, we will estimate transportation times in order to judge effectiveness. 
Focusing on the 12,000+ lines of data representing orders not held within the 
inventory, we first needed to establish the average amount of time that was permitted for 
RDD to be met. Shown in Table 5, the average RDD was 42.31 days from the order date 
(12,753 line items used in the calculation). 
Table 5.   RDD (All Data) 
 
  







The next step we took was to determine the average amount of time LOGCOM 
needed when an item was not in their inventory. Ultimately it is this number that our 
research will aim to reduce, and as a result increase the likelihood of meeting RDD on a 
more consistent basis. As Table 6 indicates, in 2003 LOGCOM was consuming on 
average 10.85 days for an item to be procured and shipped, however we noticed the 
standard deviation of 13.57 was significant and needed further investigation.   
Table 6.   LOGCOM Delays (All Data) 
 
 
2. PERT Analysis 
With the objective of reducing delays, our next step was to determine the 
procedures that must take place within LOGCOM when items are requested and not in 
the inventory. Using the inputs from subject matter experts familiar with the process, we 
built the process flow chart in Figure 11. The process flow steps are labeled A through I, 
which will be consistent labeling throughout our depictions. For simplicity purposes, we 
excluded portions that would exit the scope of our analysis, such as the requested item 
being found in WRMRI or contracting the industrial base for acquisition, which begins its 
own, much longer, process as the contracts are sought, negotiated, and fulfilled. 








Figure 11.  Process Flow Chart. Source: LOGCOM (2016). 
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In our interviews with LOGCOM, we were also given flow time estimates for 
every procedure highlighted above. From the subject matter experts point of view, these 
times were given as the Optimistic (a), Pessimistic (b) and Most Likely (m) amounts of 
time each procedure would take. Using the three-point approximation technique, we were 
able to derive the mean and standard deviation for each step (task) using the following 
formulas (OR-AS, 2011): 
Mean Task Time = (a + 4m + b) / 6 
Task Time Standard Deviation = (b – a) / 6 
It should be noted here that in our interviews we collected this data using days as 
the unit of measure. In a few cases, the interviewees reported the Optimistic, Pessimistic 
or Most Likely time simply as “less than 1 day.”  In those cases, we substituted 0.25 days 
for the Optimistic estimate (to represent six hours), 0.75 days for the Most Likely 
estimate (representing 18 hours) and 1 for the Pessimistic estimate (representing 24 
hours). Table 7 shows the results of our interviews. 
Table 7.   Process Analysis Using 2016 Inputs 
 
 
We also want to address an assumption that was made regarding the computation 
of mean and standard deviation for Step I. It is at this point that we acknowledge the 
blending of information received via interviews in 2016, and the data we were given from 
back in 2003. For Step I, we wanted to know the amount of time it would take for 
LOGCOM to receive notice of shipment from the source of supply and felt the best way 










A Request Entered in System 0.2500 0.7500 1.5000 0.7917 0.2083
B Item Not Found in Inventory 0.2500 0.5000 0.7500 0.5000 0.0833
C Request Posted to Suspended Acquisition Report 0.2500 0.7500 1.0000 0.7083 0.1250
D Funds Requested from P&R (LOGCOM) 0.2500 0.7500 1.0000 0.7083 0.1250
E P&R Requests Funding from HQMC 0.2500 1.0000 2.0000 1.0417 0.2917
F LOGCOM Recieves Funding 0.2500 3.0000 7.0000 3.2083 1.1250
G P&R Authorizes Funds in SABRS 0.2500 1.0000 1.0000 0.8750 0.1250
H Funding Applied and Released to Source of Supply 0.2500 0.7500 1.0000 0.7083 0.1250
I Receive Shipping Status from Source of Supply 6.9481 12.8429
Process Analysis Using 2016 Inputs
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So the mean and standard deviation computations for Step I were not done using the 
three-point approximation technique and were instead done using actual data, with the 
acknowledgement it is from 2003.  
3. Crystal Ball Model 
Using the data above we were able to construct our Crystal Ball model. Table 8 is 
a screen shot of the model, where the blue colored cell represents the total time for the 
process to be completed. By defining this blue cell as a forecast cell, Crystal Ball will 
track the completion times for every simulation that we run and will provide outputs that 
we can analyze in follow on chapters. Each of the green cells are defined distributions 
which vary depending on the way the data was collected for each particular step. 
Table 8.   Crystal Ball Model with 2016 Interview Inputs  
 
  
Step Activity Start Time Duration End Time
A Request Entered in System
B Item Not Found in Inventory
C Request Posted to Suspended Acquisition Report
D Funds Requested from P&R (LOGCOM)
E P&R Requests Funding from HQMC
F LOGCOM Receives Funding
G P&R Authorizes Funds in SABRS
H Funding Applied and Released to Source of Supply
I Receive Shipping Status from Source of Supply
Crystal Ball - 2016 Inputs
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Steps A through H were defined using a BetaPERT distribution. According to the 
Crystal Ball software, “this distribution is derived from the beta distribution and is 
commonly used in project risk analysis for assigning probabilities to step durations and 
costs. The parameters required for the BetaPERT distribution are the optimistic 
(Minimum), most likely (Mode), and pessimistic (Maximum) estimates” (Oracle 
Corporation, 2008). Figure 12 is an example of the BetaPERT distribution created in 
Crystal Ball for “Step F: LOGCOM Receives Funding.”  The distribution parameters are 
pulled directly from the data shown in Table 8, and this process was done exactly the 
same for all Steps A through H. 
 
Figure 12.  BetaPERT Distribution of Step F 
Step I was defined using a Lognormal Distribution. Using the 12,753 lines of 
actual data, we ran the Anderson-Darling goodness-of-fit statistics tool within Crystal 
Ball. The Crystal Ball outputs to support our decision are shown in Figure 13.  
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Figure 13.  Goodness-of-fit Statistics Tool Results of Step I 
We concluded the Lognormal Distribution was a good fit for our data since the 
minimum times must be more than zero, and on rare occasion times could increase 
seemingly without limit. Figure 14 shows the Lognormal Distribution in our model that 
uses the 12,753 lines of actual data.  
 
Figure 14.  Lognormal Distribution for 2003 Data of Step I 
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C. SUMMARY 
We also sought to incorporate an activity-on-node diagram in accordance with 
common PERT methodologies; however, it proved to be of little use as the path we 
analyzed was determined to be the critical path, as far as the scope of this research would 
allow. As it was completely linear, no viable slack would exist (“Program Evaluation and 
Review Technique,” 2016). Thus, we determined it to be unserviceable for our purposes.   
The primary method for our analysis was then to determine the likelihood of 
satisfying an order within an acceptable service window by leveraging Crystal Ball 
software. These outputs, coupled with our understanding of the critical path’s steps, aided 
us in identifying areas of risk and suggesting applicable mitigation practices, leading us 
to Chapter IV: Results and Recommendations. 
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IV. RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. RESULTS USING 2016 PROCESS FLOW 
1. Overview 
At this stage of our research, we are ready to discuss the results of our findings. 
Using the Crystal Ball Software, we display the outputs after running 100,000 trials. 
Figure 15 shows the summarized statistics and Figure 16 is the distribution of all outputs 
for all 100,000 trials.   
 
Figure 15.  Summarized Statistics of Crystal Ball Trials 
Figure 15 shows us that after 100,000 trials, our average (mean) expected delay 
time for LOGCOM is 14.8342 days, or just over two full weeks. Our standard deviation 
of 9.1215 is high resulting in the large range in values that we identified. After 100,000 
trials the shortest amount of time the LOGCOM process took to complete was just over 
five days, and the longest was just over 427 days. A completion time of 427 days back in 
2003 would have obviously been an issue considering that the USMC began the invasion 
of Iraq on 20 March 2003, and combat operations were declared complete by President 
George W. Bush on 1 May 2003. 
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Figure 16 takes the summary statistics and displays them in a way to visually see 
the distribution with the mean of 14.8342 labeled. We acknowledge that the usefulness of 
Figure 16 is limited due to the fact that we have the Crystal Ball settings adjusted in order 
to display all 100,000 trial results. In follow on figures we will eliminate the tail ends of 
the distribution in order to provide a more meaningful visualization, but for now we 
wanted to emphasize the range of our results. 
 
Figure 16.  Distribution of Outputs from Crystal Ball Trials 
2. Probability of RDD Being Met 
We now take a closer look at the distribution of completion times. Using the same 
set of results from our 100,000 trials (only 98,002 displayed) we provide probabilities of 
a particular item being shipped within timelines that we feel is sufficient to meet RDD. 
For this part of our analysis, we reference data discussed in Chapter III where we 
identified the average RDD in 2003 was 42.31 days (will round down to 42 days). With 
RDD established at 42 days, we will use ten day increments (10/20/30 days) to allow for 
variability in the USTRANSCOM transportation process.   
Thus, if an item takes all 42 days to be processed for shipping, it is guaranteed to 
exceed the RDD when accounting for USTRANSCOM’s physical shipping. If an item 
takes RDD minus 10 days, this affords USTRANSCOM those 10 days to physically 
transport the item and increasing the likelihood of the item arriving on or before RDD. 
The same applies for RDD minus 20 or 30, further increasing the probability of the item 
 39 
arriving prior to RDD. In general terms, when an item is processed faster, 
USTRANSCOM has more time to deliver the item, and the probability of meeting RDD 
is increased. These increments give us flexibility in our analysis, as the variability of 
USTRANSCOM’s transportation times are outside the scope of this report. 
Figure 17 shows that after 100,000 trials there is a 98.244% probability that an 
item will be shipped on or before RDD of 42 days. The mean of 14.8342 can be seen 
relative to the rest of the distribution.   
 
Figure 17.  Probability of Shipping before RDD (42 Days or Less) 
Figure 18 shows that after 100,000 trials there is a 96.112% probability that an 
item will be shipped on or before RDD minus 10 days (32 days from order date). This 
model would tell LOGCOM that they have a 96.112% chance of meeting RDD if 
USTRANSCOM needed only 10 days or less to ship the item into theater. The instances 




Figure 18.  Probability of Shipping before RDD Minus 10 (32 Days or Less) 
Figure 19 shows that after 100,000 trials there is an 89.114% probability that an 
item will be shipped on or before RDD minus 20 days (22 days from order date). This 
model would tell LOGCOM that they have an 89.114% chance of meeting RDD if 
USTRANSCOM needed only 20 days or less to ship the item into theater. The instances 
that would then exceed RDD are shown in red. 
 
Figure 19.   Probability of Shipping before RDD Minus 20 (22 Days or Less) 
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And finally Figure 20 shows that after 100,000 trials there is a 46.142% 
probability that an item will be shipped on or before RDD minus 30 days (12 days from 
order date). This model would tell LOGCOM that they have a 46.142% chance of 
meeting RDD if USTRANSCOM needed 30 days or less to ship the item into theater. 
The instances that would then exceed RDD are shown in red. 
 
Figure 20.  Probability of Shipping before RDD Minus 30 (12 Days or Less) 
We feel that this type of analysis will be valuable for LOGCOM during their 
planning process. When a decision is being made on whether to keep certain parts in 
inventory, they can now understand the level of risk, stated in days, of not having that 
item in inventory and how likely they will be to miss the RDD. 
B. RESULTS OF HYPOTHETICAL MODELING 
It is this point in our research that our Crystal Ball simulation provides its greatest 
value by allowing us to simulate hypothetical scenarios and analyze possible areas for 
improvement. We have spent extensive time researching the processes within LOGCOM 
and the completion times of each step. We have also shown levels of risk associated with 
missing RDD when the current processes are completed. Now we will manipulate 
completion times of the various steps and rerun our model in order to show where 
investment in improvements might be most valuable. 
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1. Generating Hypothetical Scenarios Using LSS Methods 
Our first step in implementing improvements was to identify the processes that 
contributed the most to delays and variability. Using Crystal Ball we produced a Tornado 
Diagram (similar to a Pareto Chart) in order to tell us where to focus our efforts. The 
results of the Tornado Diagram are shown in Figure 21. 
 
Figure 21.  Tornado Diagram of Expected Delays Using 2016 Inputs 
Using the results shown in the Tornado Diagram, we will focus on two 
hypothetical scenarios to show the impacts that could be made on meeting RDD. The first 
scenario will be centered on LOGCOM establishing standards with suppliers to not only 
reduce turnaround time, but also variability (Step I). The second scenario will focus on 
the internal procedures of the USMC in how LOGCOM requests and receives approval 
for funding (Steps D, E, F and G). 
A good tool to help categorize delays within each step is the cause and effect 
diagram, also known as the fishbone diagram. There are many factors that may be 
contributing to delays, but the key is to identify which factors are controllable. Therefore, 
each factor causing delay will be classified as: 
• C: Controllable (Knowledge) 
• P: Procedural (Systems, People) 
• N: Noise (Uncontrollable, External) 
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The outline of a fishbone diagram associated with the WRM Program’s Process 
Flow can be found in Figure 22. The corresponding Table 9 identifies potential defect 
origins and uses the previously discussed classifications to determine the likelihood of 
making improvements. For the purpose of building our hypothetical models, we only 
focused on Steps D, E, F, G and I. With more time it should be noted that a deep-dive 
into every step should be conducted in order to find all potential improvements.  
 
Figure 22.  Fishbone Diagram of WRM Program’s Process Flow 




Steps D through G all correspond to obtaining funding in order to acquire the 
items requested but not held in the inventory. In Step D, LOGCOM must route an 
unfunded deficiency report to P&R requesting approriate funding to fulfill shortfalls. Step 
E cannot begin until P&R has received LOGCOM’s valid funding request. P&R assesses 
and validates LOGCOM’s request and subsequently routes it to HQMC, Step F, for their 
approval. HQMC is now the third party involved in certifying LOGCOM’s funding 
request. Once approved by HQMC, P&R will then authorize funding in Standard 
Accounting Budgeting Reporting System (SABRS), Step G. SABRS is a database that 
integrates budgeting and accouting information to allow the USMC to manage 
appropriations and monitor a unit’s authorized, committed, obligated, and liquidated 
expenses.       
In examining Steps D through G, eliminating or streamlinging over processing 
and beauracratic procedures could potentially improve LOGCOM’s process cycle time. It 
is understood and acknowledged that LOGCOM must request additional funding through 
multiple levels of HQMC’s CoC. However, during major contigency operations, wasted 
time associated to overprocessing can be crucial in determining mission success.   
Solutions could include refining standard operating procedures with any eye towards 
efficiency and eliminating unnecessary steps, or perhaps a common software solution that 
would make approval and application of funds simultaneous.     
 To reduce delays in Step I, LOGCOM can establish various contracting methods 
with vendors to expediate the items release for shipping. A USMC Regional Contracting 
Office will help LOGCOM establish contracts associated to acquiring products with little 
lead time. Contracting officers can establish indefinite delivery; indefinite quantity 
contracts (ID/IQ) with multiple vendors that can be executed during contingency 
operations. ID/IQs are ideal when LOGCOM cannot determine a precise quantity during 
a specific period and they need to streamline the process and delivery. Another option to 
simplify acquisitions procedures is through blanket purchase agreements. Blanket 
purchase agreements, similar to charge accounts, are utilized to fulfill anticipated 
repetitive requirements with trustworthy vendors. Streamlining the process will reduce 
delays as it removes the contracting administrative burden.   
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Assuming that some of these LSS approaches and contracting methods could be 
applied, we will generate two separate hypothetical process flows scenarios. These 
scenarios will be simulated using reduced completion times and standard deviations to 
reflect implementation of the principles discussed in this section. Outputs of the models 
will illustrate the potential effects. 
2. Scenario #1: Controlling Variability 
Our research clearly showed that Step I was the largest contributor to delays and 
variability. Analysis of the 2003 historical data showed that Step I had an average 
completion time (mean) of 6.2587 days, and a standard deviation of 9.0082 days.   
In this scenario, we ran our simulation using a reduced completion time for Step I 
at 5.000 days and a reduced standard deviation of 3.000 days. We have used the 
following figures to once again judge our results based on the RDD of 42 days. We also 
use estimated shipment times in 10-day increments (10/20/30 days) in order to account 
for the variable of USTRANSCOM requirements.  
After 100,000 trials using the modified data for Step I, we see results outlined in 
Figure 23. When compared to the original simulation, some of the improvements are 
significant.   The mean is reduced from 14.8342 days to 13.5502 days; however, it is the 
levels of variation that are most notable. Standard deviation is reduced from 9.1215 down 
to 3.3020 (coefficient of variation reduced from .6149 to .2437). The reductions in 
variability are valuable in that the maximum wait time for a particular item is now just 
51.0121 days versus the original 427.9033 days. It should be noted that there was a slight 
increase in minimum completion times due to the reduction in variability. We conclude 
this is a valuable tradeoff with the ability to more accurately forecast completion time.  
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Figure 23.  Summarized Statistics of Crystal Ball Outputs for Scenario #1 
Figure 24 shows that after 100,000 trials there is a 99.991% probability that an 
item will be shipped on or before RDD of 42 days. In other words, in this simulation 
there is only a .009% probability that the item will ship after the 42 day RDD deadline. 
The mean of 13.5502 can be seen relative to the rest of the distribution.   
 
Figure 24.  Scenario #1 Probability of Shipping before RDD (42 Days or Less) 
Figure 25 shows that after 100,000 trials there is a 99.890% probability that an 
item will be shipped on or before RDD minus 10 days (32 days from order date). This 
model would tell LOGCOM that they have a 99.890% chance of meeting RDD if 
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USTRANSCOM needed only 10 days or less to ship the item into theater. This is an 
improvement from the original model which showed a success rate of only 96.112%. 
 
Figure 25.  Scenario #1 Probability of Shipping before RDD Minus 10 
(32 Days or Less) 
Figure 26 shows that after 100,000 trials there is a 97.731% probability that an 
item will be shipped on or before RDD minus 20 days (22 days from order date). This 
model would tell LOGCOM that they have a 97.731% chance of meeting RDD if 
USTRANSCOM needed only 20 days or less to ship the item into theater. We again see 
performance improvement as the original model only gave LOGCOM an 89.114% of 
success. The instances that would then exceed RDD are shown in red. 
 
Figure 26.  Scenario #1 Probability of Shipping before RDD Minus 20 
(22 Days or Less) 
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And finally Figure 27 shows that after 100,000 trials there is now a 34.935% 
probability that an item will be shipped on or before RDD minus 30 days (12 days from 
order date). This model would tell LOGCOM that they have a 34.935% chance of 
meeting RDD if USTRANSCOM needed 30 days or less to ship the item into theater. 
The instances that would then exceed RDD are shown in red. This scenario actually 
shows a loss in performance as the original model gave LOGCOM a 46.142% chance of 
meeting RDD minus 30 days. The tradeoff here is by reducing variability planners could 
more accurately forecast delivery despite its slower overall speed.  
 
Figure 27.  Scenario #1 Probability of Shipping before RDD Minus 30 
(12 Days or Less) 
3. Scenario #2: Controlling Mean Completion Time 
Our second scenario focused on process improvement takes a look at Steps D, E F 
and G. Each of these steps are USMC procedures for LOGCOM to receive funding to 
acquire necessary items. It is because each of these steps are closely related, and within 
the control of USMC and LOGCOM that we feel improving this set of steps is possible. 
In our original model the combined average completion time for these four steps 
is 5.8333 days, with the pessimistic estimate as high as 11 days. The combined standard 
deviation is 1.1755 days. Table 10 shows the original values for Steps D, E, F and G 
when compared to our new estimates (Adjusted Values) used in running the simulation 
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for scenario #2. Average completion time is now assumed to 1.8750 days, and a 
combined standard deviation of .1909 days. 
Table 10.   Scenario #2 Adjusted Values (Changed Values Highlighted in Blue) 
 
 
After 100,000 trials using the modified data for Steps D, E, F and G, we see 
results outlined in Figure 28. When compared to the original simulation, the mean is 
reduced from 14.8342 days to 10.8245 days. However, standard deviation is reduced 
from 9.1215 down to just 8.7747 and the coefficient of variation actually increases from 
.6149 to .8106. While minimum completion time is reduced, we still have high variability 
within the overall process. This results in the rare possibility of significant wait times as 
we see in this simulation (maximum completion time of over 261 days).    
 










A Request Entered in System 0.2500 0.7500 1.5000 0.7917 0.2083
B Item Not Found in Inventory 0.2500 0.5000 0.7500 0.5000 0.0833
C Request Posted to Suspended Acquisition Report 0.2500 0.7500 1.0000 0.7083 0.1250
D Funds Requested from P&R (LOGCOM) 0.2500 0.2500 0.2500 0.3333 0.0833
E P&R Requests Funding from HQMC 0.2500 0.2500 0.2500 0.3333 0.0833
F LOGCOM Recieves Funding 0.2500 1.0000 1.0000 0.8750 0.1250
G P&R Authorizes Funds in SABRS 0.2500 0.2500 0.7500 0.3330 0.0833
H Funding Applied and Released to Source of Supply 0.2500 0.7500 1.0000 0.7083 0.1250
I Receive Shipping Status from Source of Supply 6.9481 12.8429
Process Analysis with Adjusted Values
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Figure 29 shows that after 100,000 trials there is a 98.706% probability that an 
item will be shipped on or before RDD of 42 days. The mean of 10.8245 can be seen 
relative to the rest of the distribution. This result of 98.706% probability is a slight 
increase when judged against the original model that provided a 98.244% probability.  
 
Figure 29.   Scenario #2 Probability of Shipping before RDD (42 Days or Less) 
Figure 30 shows that after 100,000 trials there is a 97.299% probability that an 
item will be shipped on or before RDD minus 10 days (32 days from order date). This 
model would tell LOGCOM that they have a 97.299% chance of meeting RDD if 
USTRANSCOM needed only 10 days or less to ship the item into theater. This shows 
performance improvement as the original only gave 96.112% probability of success.  
 
Figure 30.  Scenario #2 Probability of Shipping before RDD Minus 10 
(32 Days or Less) 
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Figure 31 shows that after 100,000 trials there is a 93.280% probability that an 
item will be shipped on or before RDD minus 20 days (22 days from order date). This 
model would tell LOGCOM that they have a 93.280% chance of meeting RDD if 
USTRANSCOM needed only 20 days or less to ship the item into theater. The instances 
that would then exceed RDD are shown in red. This again shows performance 
improvement as the original model only gave 89.114% probability of success.  
 
Figure 31.   Scenario #2 Probability of Shipping before RDD Minus 20 
(22 Days or Less) 
Finally, Figure 32 shows that after 100,000 trials there is a 75.407% probability 
that an item will be shipped on or before RDD minus 30 days (12 days from order date). 
This model would tell LOGCOM that they have a 75.407% chance of meeting RDD if 
USTRANSCOM needed 30 days or less to ship the item into theater. The instances that 
would then exceed RDD are shown in red. Here we see dramatic performance 
improvement as the original model only gave 46.142% probability of success.  
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Figure 32.  Scenario #2 Probability of Shipping before RDD Minus 30 
(12 Days or Less) 
C. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Having now run three separate simulations (100,000 trials each), we use the 
results to shape our recommendations. First we want to discuss Figure 33, which gives a 
visual comparison of the three separate simulations we outlined previously.   
 
Figure 33.  Probability Comparison of Timely Deliveries between Original 
Simulation and Scenarios #1 and #2 
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The original simulation results shown in blue were extracted from Crystal Ball by 
using current LOGCOM procedures and task time estimates. No modifications were 
made to task times in this simulation.     
In red we show the results for Scenario #1, where we reduced the task time and 
standard deviation of Step I. It is in this simulation that we saw dramatic improvement in 
variability, but not much improvement in mean completion time. In using RDD, RDD 
minus 10 and RDD minus 20 we see improvement in performance, but notice that in the 
probability of meeting RDD minus 30 (i.e., shipment after 12 days from order date) we 
actually see a reduction to just 34.935%. 
In green we have the results of Scenario #2, where we modified the times for 
Steps D, E, F and G. Impacts of this scenario were mostly focused on reducing mean task 
time, and less about reducing variability. Across all four RDD situations, we see 
improvement when compared with the original simulation. The most dramatic 
improvement comes in RDD minus 30 where probability of success increases to 
75.407%. While this improvement is significant, we acknowledge that within Scenario #2 
the issue of variability still exists resulting in the potential for significant wait times when 
the system misses a deadline. In our simulation, the maximum wait time was still over 
261 days.   
Our first recommendation to LOGCOM is to analyze all steps and focus on 
reducing the mean completion time of the overall process. In Scenario #2 we focused on 
Steps D, E, F and G because each of these steps are closely related, and within the control 
of USMC and LOGCOM. Additionally, if we assume that transportation times can take 
as long as 30 days (as is often the case) then improving probability of success from 
46.14% (original model) to 75.40% (Scenario #2) is a worthwhile investment.    
Our second recommendation to LOGCOM is to address the issue of variability, 
and reduce it to acceptable levels. Scenario #2 showed performance improvements, but 
without reducing the main sources of variability the model showed wait times that seem 
unacceptable. Put simply, when Scenario #2 missed a deadline – it had a potential to miss 
big. Scenario #1 on the other hand focused on Step I to show the value in reducing 
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variability. While we acknowledge a decrease in performance in the category of “RDD 
minus 30,” it is the maximum wait times that should be highlighted. In Scenario #2, the 
maximum wait time was over 261 days, compared to Scenario #1 where it was only 51 
days. That could mean the difference between getting an item late, versus never getting it 
at all. 
Knowing that Step I is dependent on third party suppliers, improvements in this 
area could be challenging. Future contracts should be written in a way that outline the 
priorities of the service and holds suppliers accountable to delivery timelines. Building 
and maintaining relationships between suppliers and the service will also help to ensure 
that as priorities shift all parties are informed and are prepared to meet the future needs of 
the Marine Corps. 
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V. FURTHER RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INVENTORY CONSIDERATION 
1. Inventory/Risk Calculations 
We were unable to conduct an in-depth study on the WRMR calculation process 
by the WRS. These calculations are used by annual planning conferences to determine 
the required inventory levels, and the accuracy of their predictions affect the number of 
withdrawals that will not be able to be satisfied by the WRMRI alone. While these 
calculations and plans could never be perfected due to the uncertainty of future events, 
perhaps the levels of risked assumed while using them could be better understood by 
future studies. Example considerations are:  
• Can the WRS calculations for inventory requirements be updated or 
improved?  
• What methods can be developed to improve risk estimation throughout the 
planning process? 
• Can any efficiencies be gained in the system/personnel planning process? 
2. Cost/Benefit Analysis of Maintaining Inventory 
Additionally, should certain item types prove to be more prone to delays or incur 
proportionally more risk if they were delayed, a Cost/Benefit Analysis could prove 
useful. This CBA could examine the possibility and feasibility of keeping a surpluses of 
said item types and incorporate their findings into recommendations for the planning 
process. 
B. TRANSPORTATION VARIABILITY CONSIDERATIONS 
As noted in Figure 18 in Chapter IV-A-3, there are transportation times 
incorporated in the entire timeline from both LOGCOM and USTRANSCOM (HQMC, 
2011). While both were outside our scope, an examination of whole timeline, to include 
transportation variability, could offer more insight into the process, from customer 
request to receipt.  
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To do so would require research into USTRANSCOM, which is enormous and 
complex. We believe that value could still be gained by just examining the movement 
actions and transportation aspects of LOGCOM and improve upon our analysis of WRM 
Programs Process Flow. 
C. ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL RESOURCES 
While we sought potential efficiency throughout the administrative Process Flow, 
we were unable to conduct sensitivity testing on request queues. Our analysis assumes an 
average flow of orders, and does not account for backlogs and what resources would be 
strained under such circumstances. Thus, further research could seek to answer: 
• How significantly does an increase of order quantities affect the Process 
Flow? 
• How sensitive is the Process Flow to fluctuations in order quantities? 
• What bottlenecks exist in the Process Flow and how can capacity be 
increased at the bottlenecks? 
D. CONTRACT PROCESS ANALYSIS 
While determining the Process Flow, we noted that if a requested item is not 
available in the WRMRI and no Inner Agency Service is able to support, contracting 
must be pursued. This exits the Process Flow we examined and enters a significantly 
longer one which could not be incorporated into the scope of our analysis. LOGCOM’s 
War Reserve inventory is a stockpile of assets or consumables produced by multiple 
contractors. Simplified acquisition or contracting methods have been established to 
expedite deliveries or anticipate future requirements. Future research could answer the 
following questions related to contracting: 
• Can the delivery of products from contractors be expedited if a Regional 
Contracting Office is established at LOGCOM locations? 
• How can contracting officers at LOGCOM utilize Federal Acquisition 
Regulation Part 13, Simplified Acquisition Procedures, to replenish a 
depleted stock during contingency operations?  
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• Will established blanket purchase agreements or indefinite delivery; 
indefinite quantity contracts with various contractors reduce the 
probability of LOGCOM missing the RDD? 
• To support future contingencies, can funding for blanket purchase 
agreements or indefinite delivery; indefinite quantity contracts be 
expedited by HQMC for LOGCOM? 
• When items are not in stock and no substitute is readily available, will 
offering fixed-price incentive contracts to contractors increase the 
probability that LOGCOM can meet RDD?    
E. ITEM TYPE CONSIDERATIONS 
All unique document numbers utilized in the research were SAC I or II items, 
primarily maintenance parts and consumable items. SAC I and II items are significantly 
cheaper to acquire than SAC III, principle end items. SAC III assets, such as M1A1 
Abram Tanks and Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Trucks, are procured and acquired 
through stricter channels due to the costs and sensitivity. Using unit levels are able to 
order SAC I and II items through their organic supply chain, but unable to order SAC III 
items. SAC III items must be requested through multiple CoCs.     
Within LOGCOM, SAC I and II items are easier to maintain a substantially larger 
stockpile than SAC III items. When a request for SAC III items cannot be fulfilled, 
LOGCOM has to take an alternate approach to satisfy that request than they do for SAC I 
or II items. LOGCOM is unauthorized to order these assets despite additional funding 
provided by HQMC. After analyzing historical OIF withdraw data, future research could 
answer the following questions: 
• How can LOGCOM obtain SAC III assets quicker if they are not currently 
held within the existing War Reserve inventory? 
• Based off the current WRWP, can LOGCOM’s existing inventory 
successfully fulfill all SAC III requests for a contingency similar in size 
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